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Resumo – O presente artigo trata da discussão em Filosofia da Linguagem sobre a validade 
ou não de se considerar nome próprio como portador de significado.
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 “Don’t stand chattering to yourself like that” 
Humpty Dumpty said, looking at her for the first time, 
“but tell me your name and your business.” 
“My name is Alice, but –” 
“It’s a stupid name enough!” 
Humpty Dumpty interrupted impatiently.
“What does it mean?”
“Must a name mean something?”  
Alice asked doubtfully.
“Of course it must”, 
Humpty Dumpty said with a laugh: my name means the shape 
I am and a good handsome shape it is, too. 
“With a name like yours, you might be any shape, almost.”1 
This  passage  from  Lewis  Carroll’s  Through  the 
Looking-Glass  which  is  of  a  misleading  simplicity 
expresses, indeed, one of the most intriguing puzzles in 
the history of philosophy of language. 
 
(A)  How do proper names work? 
 
In our daily use of ordinary language, nothing is 
more elementary than the act of naming. People do name 
things or persons in a natural, non-problematic way. And 
because of this, it is not surprising that, from Aristotle to 
Kripke, the attempts to have a proper understanding of 
this basic property of human languages have been subject 
to so many barriers that, if not insurmountable, are at least 
of extreme complexity. 
Semantics, in its modern version, might represent 
the most specific subject to the logical, philosophical and 
linguistic researches on the reference phenomena, under 
which there are maybe the most relevant questions to a 
theory of meaning of natural languages, once through the 
act of referring the world becomes part of language and 
language becomes part of the world.1 
Within the general context of the reference theory 
the proper name has a special place for it seems that 
the  moment  it  has  to  depict  the  object,  it  becomes 
extremely  opaque. This  lack  of  semantic  consistency 
has brought, especially to logicians, a huge theoretical 
difficulty. In the first part of the last century, Stuart Mill 
with his first book about the system of Logic Of names 
and  propositions  can  undoubtedly  be  considered  one 
of  the  precursors  of  the  contemporary  investigations 
on the nature of names.2 For Mill, “Proper names are 
not  connotative.  They  denote  the  individuals  who 
 
1  Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass.
2    Further details in Costa (1997), “A teoria dos Nomes na Lógica de Mill”. 
In: BOMBASSARO; PAVIANI. Filosofia, lógica e existência. Caxias do 
Sul: EDUCS. Humpty Dumpty and Alice on the Naming Puzzle  19
Letras de Hoje, Porto Alegre, v. 44, n. 3, p. 18-21, jul./set. 2009
are called by them; but they don’t indicate or imply any 
attributes as belonging to those individuals”.3 
Frege, in his attempt to construct a logical foundation 
to arithmetic had to work thoroughly with the concept 
of proper name which appear in a decisive way, though 
fragmented, in almost all of his work, 
The meaning of a proper name is the object itself 
which we designate by using it; the idea which we 
have in that case is wholly subjective; in between lies 
the sense, which is indeed no longer subjective like the 
idea, but is yet not the object itself .4  
As it can be seen, inside his logics project Frege tried 
to distinguish, in terms of proper names, the designated 
object, what he called “reference” from the way it is 
determined,  what  he  called  “sense”  of  a  subjective 
mental representation, or idea, totally irrelevant to logic. 
By following this point of view, although firmly devoted 
to the interests of his formal project, Frege managed to 
define a proper name in its common sense. 
In the case of an actual proper name such as “Aristotle” 
opinions as to sense may differ. It might, for instance, 
be taken to be the following: the pupil of Plato and 
teacher of Alexander the Great. Anybody who does 
this will attach another sense to the sentence “Aristotle 
was born in Stagira” than will a man who takes as 
the sense of the name: the teacher of Alexander the 
Great who was born in Stagira. So long as the thing 
meant remains the same, such variations of sense may 
be tolerated, although they are to be avoided in the 
theoretical structure of a demonstrative science and 
ought not occur in a perfect language.5 
Because of such issues, whether he wanted or not, 
Frege had to work on the proper name category to give 
consistency to his theoretical architecture. It is Dummett, 
undoubtedly the most devoted critic of Frege, who calls 
attention to this fact: 
If we do not know precisely what constitutes a “proper 
name” in Frege’s sense, that is, a singular term, then 
we likewise do not know precisely what constitutes 
any  one  of  the  various  categories  of  incomplete 
expressions save the essential operators: for, as we 
have seen, these categories are defined inductively, 
starting with “proper names” (...).6
Likewise, to Russell, a contemporary of Frege’s, 
proper  names  constitute  a  big  issue  of  theoretical 
relevance not only to logic and mathematics but mainly 
to the theory of knowledge, once the process of denoting 
is of indisputable importance to these subjects. 
(...) the subject of denoting is of very great importance, 
not  in  logic  and  mathematics,  but  also  in  theory  of 
knowledge.7
Russell claims, however, that due to the fact that the 
importance of this theory of proper names is only well 
known to logicians, it has been neglected throughout 
the years. To him, proper names are by definition the 
expression of particulars,34567  
The only kind of a word that is theoretically capable 
of standing for a particular is a proper name, and the 
whole matter of proper names is rather curious. 
Proper names = words for particulars,8 
although in their daily use they are nothing but abbreviated 
expressions for descriptions  for (...) The names that we 
commonly use, like “Socrates” , are really abbreviations 
for descriptions; not only that, but what they describe 
are not particulars but complicated systems of classes 
or series.9 
Russell, like Frege, being totally devoted to his project 
of constructing the logical foundations of mathematics, 
has faced, with extreme rigor, the difficult paradoxes of 
reference in such a way that he virtually abolished  from 
the realm of proper names the proper names of ordinary 
language, as he states in his Knowledge of Language: 
That makes it very difficult to get any instance of a 
name at all in the proper strict logical sense of the 
word. The only words one does use as names in the 
logical sense are words like “this” or “that”.10 
Here, he took a route opposite to Frege’s, for whom 
the category of proper name is extremely broad. On the 
other hand, Kripke, maybe the philosopher who has done 
the most radical criticism on Frege’s ideas on proper 
names and Russell’s description theory, has also been 
developing an exhaustive analysis on this troublesome 
subject. According to him it is so problematic that he even 
suspects that any other theory of proper names would be 
wrong. 
Let me state then what the cluster concept theory of 
name is. (It really is a nice theory. The only defect I 
think it has is probably common to all philosophical 
theories. It’s wrong. You may suspect me of proposing 
another theory in its place; but I hope not, because I ́m 
sure it’s wrong too if it is a theory).11
What concerns Kripke, following a millian insight, 
is  that  the  idea  of  proper  names  being  equivalent  to 
definite descriptions or concept clusters is wrong in its 
philosophical nature. However, one should not expect 
from Kripke an alternative philosophical theory. On the   
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contrary, what he proposes is only a theoretical framework   
in which proper names, contrary to Frege’s and Russell’s 
descriptive mode, are defined as rigid designators whose 
function does not go beyond the mere fact of referring an 
object with no interference of a concept or meaning. 
In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper 
names are rigid designators, for although the man 
(Nixon) might not have been the President, it is not 
the case that he might not have been Nixon (though he 
might not have been called  “Nixon”).12 
Kripke is one of the most important authorities on 
modal logic and has given an outstanding  contribution to 
the philosophy of language, as Putnam points out,  
Kripke was led to his discoveries in the philosophy of 
language partly by work he had done previously in a 
branch of mathematical logic, modal logic, in which 
he is the world’s outstanding authority.13
His theoretical conception of proper names is in the 
core of his original and well debated Possible Worlds 
Semantics. Although this issue on proper names is still 
not quite well solved, for the past few years, a relatively 
stable theoretical framework has been developed which 
reveals the dominance of two opposing theories to the 
study of this troublesome category: the description and 
the causal theories.14 
These two theories that are the modern starting point 
of investigation on proper names have their origin on a 
questioning which unveils the theoretical knot to be untied 
by logical suppositions: 
(B)  Do proper names have meaning besides denotation? 
 
The  attempts  to  solve  this  problem  have  taken 
logicians and philosophers of language to two different 
paths. Not only from what has briefly been mentioned 
above but also according to critics, Frege, Russel, Mill 
and Kripke represent the hard core of these divergences. 
Frege and Russell despite their differences are considered 
the classical kernel of the description model while Kripke, 
based on Mill, has a similar function within the so called 
causal model. The chart below is an attempt to show the 
contemporary tendencies on the problem of the meaning 
of proper names.15 
 
12   Ibid., p. 49.
13   Cf. PUTNAM, H. Realism and reason – Philosophical papers. Cambridge: 
CUP, 1983, p. 55. 
14   Katz is one of the philosophers who have adopted this classification 
concerning the opposition between the classical and the causal theories, 
as shown in his work “A proper theory of names” in Philosophical 
Studies, v. 31, p. 1-80, 1977. Another version of his text appears in “The 
neoclassical theory of reference” in Contemporary perspectives in the 
Philosophy of Language (FRENCH, P.A.; FRENCH, T.A.; UEHLING 
Jr., T.E.; WETTSTEIN (Ed.). Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis 
Press, 1977, p. 103-129). J. Searle in Intentionality also adopts the same 
view. 
15 The  chart  below  with  minor  adjustments  is  in  Susan  Haack’s  text 
Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge Press, 1979.
ProPer Names Have meaNiNg besides deNotatioN 
Yes No
Frege 
russell
(Quine)
Proper Names have 
the meaning of a 
definite co-referential 
description known to 
the speaker
mill Proper names have 
denotation but no 
connotation
Wittgenstein
searle
(strawson)
Proper names have 
the meaning of  an 
undetermined set 
of an open set 
of co-referential 
descriptions 
Ziff Proper names are 
not part of language
davidson
burge 
Proper names are 
like predicates 
Kripke
Putnam
Proper names are 
rigid designators 
whose use is 
determined by 
causal chains
The theorists who favor description in general attribute 
a meaning to a proper name based on its correspondence 
to a set of definite descriptions normally known as “the 
such and such”. According to this view, the proper name 
‘Aristotle’ is semantically equivalent to descriptions such 
as “The teacher of Alexander”, “Plato’s student”, “the 
author of Metaphysics” or even an undetermined set of 
descriptions of this order. 
On the other hand, those in favor of a causal theory 
state that proper names do not have meaning; they only 
denote, in a rigid way, an individual through a causal 
chain fixed by any initial baptism. Within this context a 
proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ does not have meaning 
and designates Aristotle in any and every possible world, 
that is, in those where Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander 
and in those where he is not. 
This contemporary debate has sophisticated variants 
from both sides. Searle, for example, favors a kind of 
description  view,  stating  the  need  of  an  intentional 
approach in the study of proper name. 
Since linguistic reference is always dependent on or is 
a form of mental reference and since mental reference 
is always in virtue of Intentional content including 
Background and Network, proper names must in some 
way depend on Intentional content and it is now time 
to make that way – or those ways – fully explicit.16
 On the other hand, Putnam’s approach on natural 
kinds  and  physical  properties  shows  many  points  of 
contact with Kripke’s causal model. 
The  relation  to  Kripke’s  account  of  proper  names 
is  this:  in  both  accounts  things  which  are  given 
existentially and not by criteria help to fix reference. 
Actual  things,  whatever  their  description,  which 
have played a certain causal role in our acquisition 
and use of terms determine what the terms refer to. 
A term refers to something if it stands in the right 
relation (causal continuity in the case of proper names; 
sameness of “nature” in the case of kind terms) to   
these existentially given things. In the case of proper 
16   SEARLE, J. Intentionality. Cambridge: CUP, 1983. p. 232. Humpty Dumpty and Alice on the Naming Puzzle  21
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names, the existentially given thing is the person or 
thing originally “baptized” with the name; in the case 
of natural kind words, the existentially given things are 
the actual paradigms.17 
This Searle/Putnam debate expresses two radically 
opposing points of view to solve one of the most thrilling 
problems within philosophy of language. 
(C)  Where is the meaning of a name? 
To Searle, it is not possible to separate meaning from 
the intentional content that comes with it. Meaning and 
intentionality are in the same level within the game of 
language. They merge. This reason is enough for Searle 
to state that the meaning is in the mind or, in other words, 
in the head. “I think in the relevant sense that meanings 
are precisely in the head”.18
Putnam  thinks  exactly  the  other  way  round: 
Meaning is not in the head. He opposes to the traditional 
philosophical view that meaning determines reference. It 
is reference that determines meaning. Meanings are not 
in the mind, they are in the world instead.  
I described myself as a “realist” (without any qualifying 
adjective), and I chiefly emphasized the importance 
of reference in determining meaning in opposition to 
the idea, traditional among both realists and idealists, 
that it is meaning that determines reference. Reference 
itself I described as a matter of causal connections.”19 
This debate between Searle and Putnam is much more 
complex and sophisticated than it has been presented here. 
Actually, for the theory of reference it represents a kind 
of paradigm to the extreme positions to what semantics 
of natural language must be. Dummett and Davidson, 
Carnap and Quine, to cite a few, might lead this same 
debate to different directions. 
In the past 30 years, the questioning on reference 
and proper names has deserved the attention of the most 
important contemporary logicians and philosophers. We 
ask, how do linguists fit in this discussion? 
As odd as it may seem, although the proper name  is 
a linguistic entity that appears in all parts of the sentence, 
which can be part of all contexts and that together with 
the verb heads the game of language, linguists have barely 
even dedicated their attention to it. It has already become a 
faded image to say that the proper name is the poor relative 
of linguistics. It is not the purpose of this text to present 
the historical reasons that justify this fact. But it is worth 
remembering that Semantics, in its integrity, is the most 
problematic and the least developed field in Linguistics. The 
two so called linguistic revolutions, Saussure’s structural 
linguistics and Chomsky’s generative grammar have not 
comprised semantics. Saussure’s book20 is rather a work 
on the philosophy of linguistics with a methodological 
point of view against the historical and non-systematic 
studies of the XIX century than a proper linguistics book. 
On the other hand, the chomskyan revolution, as it is well 
known, deals basically with the development of syntax 
theory, although one might say that it leaves an open path 
to the modern investigations of semantics.211718192021 
Within this context it is not difficult to understand 
why the category of proper names has been historically 
put aside from the scope of linguistics. Basically, it is a 
very simple morphological linguistic entity whose syntax 
is quite similar to the syntax of names in general. Because 
of this, when contemporary linguists such as Katz work on 
proper names, they do so by following the strong heritage 
of philosophy and through the means of modern logic.22 
This strategic or naïve silence from linguists in general 
has brought some radical consequences.23   
The problem is that the technical label “proper name” 
concerns a natural language phenomenon and despite its 
importance to logic and philosophical investigations it 
cannot be ignored in terms of linguistics. It is not possible 
to admit that in logic and philosophical inquiries it is a 
common practice to referring to the linguistic intuition of 
the speakers to establish some assumptions while these 
same issues have not yet been adequately worked out 
under the point of view of Linguistics.24 After all, proper 
name, a singular term from Logic, within the context 
of natural language is not the only referring expression 
there is and surrounded by the speakers’ intentions as 
well as by the world it still carries its linguistic properties 
in the act of referring. Logicians and philosophers have 
indeed taken into consideration linguistic facts, but the 
kernel of their investigations has neither been a semantic 
theory of proper names as a natural language entity nor 
as an entity of a particular language. However, logic and 
linguistic are somehow connected concerning meaning 
and reference of a proper name. In some sense, proper 
names pure linguistic relations are the basis to the logical 
and ontological expression of reference; and this is an 
indisputable  fact.  Alice’s  naïve  question  implies  her 
astonishment as at the idea of a proper name having 
meaning. Humpty Dumpty’s categorical response implies 
his certainty about the meanings of a name.
Alice and Kripke or Humpty Dumpty and Frege?
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Chomsky has been strongly developing the syntactic component of his 
model, with no important contributions to the semantics of proper names. 
22   Katz’s “A proper theory of name” is an example of these philosophical and 
logical roots. He proposes an alternate hypothesis, a neoclassical theory of 
reference based on Kripke’s discussion over Frege and Russell’s model. 
23 Ziff, for example, suggests that proper names are not part of languages 
at all. Cf. Semantic Analysis, 1960, Ithaca: Cornell University Press,   
p. 85, 93-94. 
24 Zeno Vendler calls attention to this fact in his “Singular terms”, p. 177.